Abstract-Wireless communication links tend to be employed more and more in safety-critical railway applications. Their safe use in an advanced train control system (TCS) is an issue that is addressed in this paper by characterizing the TCS service interruption due to communication errors. More precisely, occurrence probabilities of single errors are first discussed. Then, we obtain probabilistic analytical expressions of several temporal conditions that lead to a TCS service interruption, here a train emergency braking (the critical event). The accuracy of this analytical approach is proved when the results are compared with those given by a simulation approach with a Petri net model. Additionally, as the use case related to the "trains' separation" is considered in this paper, an analytical evaluation process is proposed to discuss the tolerated time margins that can be fixed to limit the critical-event occurrence probability due to the wireless communication errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
T RAIN control systems (TCS) are relying more and more on wireless communication systems (WCS) [1] as they improve train operations, especially by offering continuous communications between embedded and ground installations. Today, the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 used for mainlines and high speed, relies on continuous exchanges via wireless cellular network known as Global System for Mobile Communications Railway (GSM-R). Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) systems used for mass transit lines, rely on wireless local area network (WLAN), IEEE 802.11x standards. In the future, among new wireless technologies, the Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology is considered as one of the promising solutions to satisfy the need to develop numerous intelligent and safe train control applications additionally to the TCS one (e.g., DAVS-Driver Assist Video System) [2] . Indeed, its architecture supports multiservice traffic and is also much less vulnerable to security threats than other wireless technologies [3] . For TCS, LTE makes possible the convergence of ETCS and CBTC systems in a unique system combining all features [4] . Besides the operation reliability and safety, the passenger comfort is also addressed by employing social network services for rail traffic applications [5] . Therefore, WCS for future railways is required to evolve from voice and signaling services to multiservice of high data rates [6] . This integration has to be realized by maintaining the current safety conditions provided today by existing TCS. This issue is addressed in this article by analyzing the impact of wireless communication errors on the TCS service interruption. In the literature, the close relationship between WCS and TCS is generally approached in three ways. The first way, from the automation engineering domain, considers the impact of the WCS performances on the train traffic flow. It is based on the assumptions that performance parameters of the WCS are known and modeled by stochastic or probabilistic variables. In [7] , the authors proposed a cellular automata model to investigate the impact of end-to-end communication delay on railway traffic flow. [8] studied the impact of random packet drops due to the frame error rate (FER) and handovers on the stability and performances of CBTC systems.
Unlike the first way that simplifies the WCS modeling, the second way focuses on the performance of the WCS with their close-to-reality-models in train control applications. In this context, the WCS performance issue takes even greater importance and is considered from the telecommunication expert's point of view while the train control modeling is simplified. Using Colored Petri Nets (CPN), the authors in [9] focused on modeling the WCS of the CBTC system in order to evaluate the transfer delay of messages between the trains and the zone controller (ZC). In [10] , using OPNET (Optimized Network Engineering Tool) simulations, the authors proved that QoS (Quality of Service) mechanisms of a deployed LTE network are efficient enough for ensuring simultaneously safety and non-safety applications in ETCS. In [11] , the authors also used the OPNET simulator to evaluate the performances offered by the LTE system to safety and non-safety applications in urban guided-transport. In [12] , the authors derived the stochastic delay thresholds of high speed train control services over fading channels using the analytical analysis based on stochastic network calculus.
On the other hand, numerous studies aimed to proposed an efficient solution to limit the negative impact such as ping-pong effect, handover delay, packet loss on the performance of TCS. The paper [13] presented a handoff algorithm with frequency combination that allows for ensuring the channel quality and optimize handoff time. In order to reduce the handover delay, the multiple-input-multiple output (MIMO) assisted handoff scheme is proposed for CBTC system based WLAN technology [14] and for the one based on LTE technology [15] . The authors in [16] proposed using cooperative relaying for train-train communication in order to enhance the train control performance of CBTC systems.
The third way considers the WCS performances from railway operator's point of view and addresses the question whether the WCS ensures the desired performance level for safety application according to the railway safety standards [17] . In this context, a single communication error can be negligible. Only communication errors that last more than a certain time and that can lead to a critical event (CE) like a collision are interesting. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the WCS model's complexity of the second way when focusing on the railway safety and operation aspects by neglecting WCS details such as fading channel effects, resource allocation, power control, etc. However, the WCS modeling in this third way is more aided than in the first way by taking into account numerous channel features such as transfer delay, loss connection rate, reconnection procedure, handover occurrence rate, handover execution time, etc. The authors in [18] presented a stochastic Petri net (SPN) model for ETCS real-time communication system in order to investigate the impact of train head-to-head distance on the train stopping probability. The proposed discrete event model corresponds to a simplified model of transmission error and recover behavior of the real-time WCS of the ETCS. In [19] , authors used stochastic automation networks to model CBTC systems in order to examine the impact of the time interval between two consecutive trains on the probability to trigger the emergency braking of the train behind. A SPN simulation-based approach for the dependability analysis of an LTE-based WCS in CBTC application is presented in [20] .duration of every principal error types of the WCS, was proposed. Based on the previous work, we develop an analytical process in this paper. This allows us to analyze the impact of wireless communication errors on the TCS and then to evaluate the occurrence probability of the CE in braking control applications. The contribution of this paper is to develop a methodology from the railway operator's point of view that allows us (1) to analyze and to evaluate communication errors that lead to the CE when no valid position message is received by the train control center (TCC) for more than a certain time, and (2) to calculate the occurrence probability of this CE. This methodology could be applied in general to different communication technologies, such as GSM-R, WLAN, or LTE by considering the corresponding transmission procedure and appropriate parameters.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we will describe the problem statement and formalize the performance parameters of the WCS. The proposed analytical approach that integrates the principal communication errors degrading CBTC services, will be presented in Section III. Then, the case study dedicated to LTE technology, its modeling and the model simulations are summarized in Section IV. An evaluation process based on the analytical approach will be proposed in Section IV-C. The process accuracy will also be proved by comparing its results with those of a simulated PN model in this subsection. Finally, Section V will present the conclusions and the further research works.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MODEL FORMULATION

A. Requirements of Train Ground Communication for TCS
Focusing on railway control commands, the expected requirements for a WCS are categorized into two groups according to following applications: 1) High-speed railway applications: In Europe, the requirements for a WCS linked to ERTMS are defined in numerous documents (e.g., [25] 1 ). 2) Urban guided transport applications: The standard IEEE 1474 provides operational and safety requirements of CBTC and mentions general requirements of performance data related to a communication system. However, these requirements could not be directly applied for construction of communication system. To our knowledge, each transport operator group defines its own needs for a specific project in order to design a corresponding WCS, as was done in Systuf. 2 A summary of the requirements of train ground communication for TCS is outside the scope of this paper because in case of (1), the requirements (qualitative and quantitative) are numerous and in case of (2), the requirements are specific to every operator group and in most cases are non-public.
B. Problem Statement
Let us consider an urban railway line equipped with an advanced TCS and assume that train 1 runs ahead of train 2. Let T m (s) be the journey time of trains. During a journey, the position/integrity messages generated by the trains are transmitted periodically to the TTC each T s (s). When receiving the position message of train 2, the TCC takes into account the position of train 1 and the signaling states of other trains, and then, sends back a movement authority message (MA) to train 2. A message is considered valid at the reception if and only if its transmission time does not exceed a value T o (obsolescence deadline for a message). To ensure safety conditions when no valid position message from train 1 is received by TCC within a period of T b (s), an emergency braking message is sent from the TCC to train 2. It corresponds to a CE that is relevant for safety and dependability evaluations. In order to evaluate the occurrence probability of this CE due to the communication errors during a train journey, the performance parameters of the LTE communication process between the train and the TCC will be examined in next subsections.
C. Performance Parameters of the Communication Process
Between the Train and the TCC 1) Transmission Delay: Let D p be the transmission delay of the packet sent by a train or by a TCC in the normal case. D p is assumed to follow the exponential distribution with the mean value λ p . Although this assumption seems to be too simple to take into account the up bound values of the packet delay, it is still widely used in communication systems, especially in the queuing theory. In fact, according to [26] (pp. 44-45), the assumption of exponential distribution for network delays is adequate for a number of experimental observations and applications. Then, the probability density function (pdf) of D p is given by:
2) Retransmission Mechanism: The goal of this paper is to propose a new methodology that could be applied in multiple different communication technologies. Therefore, we present in this section a general retransmission mechanism. When a message is sent, n r copies are created. If the transmitter (Tx) receives ACK sent by the receiver (Rx), these copies are deleted, for example, see Fig. 1 .1) when Tx receives ACK from Rx. Next, for the message 2, see Fig. 1 .2), after the retransmission time, T RE , if Tx does not yet receive ACK, it send another copy until all n r copies are sent. For GSM-R and WILAN, n r = 0 when we do not consider the retransmission mechanism. For LTE, we consider the Sync HARQ with n r = 3. Due to temporarily bad radio signal conditions, the packet loss occurs with rate p ET . The obsolescence deadline T o includes the n r + 1 versions of a message (1 original version and n r copies). For example, see Fig. 1 .2), Rx does not receive the original version and two first copies of message 2 due to packet loss errors. Next, the third copy arrives at Rx after the obsolescence deadline T o (counted from the first sending time of the message 2), then it is considered as an obsolescent message and does not valid for train control application.
3) Connection Loss: Let D l be the time to the connection loss, in other words, the on-time duration of connection, and let D rc be the reconnection time. D l is assumed to follow the exponential distribution, [18] :
The train hardware detects this state after some time-out, T d and tries to establish a new connection with the failed reconnection probability p f . In detail, when the reconnection duration is greater than b, the re-establishment is considered as false and then another attempt is made, [18] . The recovery time of a successful connection is assumed to follow the uniform distribution of UNIF [a, b] . Thus, for h reconnection with h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∞}, the probability density function of the reconnection time is given by:
If the connection is established at the first attempt, h = 1, then the reconnection time, D rc , belongs to the interval [a, b]. The probability that the connection is successful at the first attempt is 1 − p f . Therefore, the probability density function of the reconnection time is given by f D rc = 0 for t ≤ a and
. Next, the probability that the first attempt of reconnection is failed and the second reconnection is successful 
4) Handover Performance:
Handover processes occur every time the train crosses the limit between the communication areas of two neighboring radio base stations (called eNodeB in an LTE network). When the train is operating normally, the inter-occurrence time of handovers can be associated with one of the two assumptions that follow:
• either it can be considered as a constant, T Ho (s). Then, the distribution of time D k when handover occurs for the k-th time is:
where δ {condition} = 1 when the condition is true and δ {condition} = 0 when the condition is false.
• or it can be considered as independent and exponentially distributed with the rate λ Ho [18] . Then, the distribution of the time T k when handover occurs for the k-th time follows the Gamma law:
The execution time of handovers is assumed to follow the exponential distribution with the rate λ eH , [18] . Let D eH be the handover delay, then its pdf is:
When the packet is sent during the handover processes, its transmission delay is defined by D eH + D p .
III. ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL TYPES OF COMMUNICATION ERRORS IN THE TCS
For the advanced TCS, a single communication error (such as losing one packet) can be negligible. The communication error becomes important when a fixed time interval is exceeded. In other words, missing consecutive valid messages at the train or the TCC will lead to CE. Therefore, in this section, we will analyze the principal types of communication errors that can lead to missing consecutive valid messages at the receiver. In general, these errors are classified by the following types:
• Type A-loss of n consecutive messages in normal condition (without a handover process or a connection loss) where n is the minimum number of invalid messages that can lead to the CE.
• Type B-long execution time of handovers during more than T 1 s where T 1 is the minimal duration of errors that can lead to the CE.
• Type C-long timeout of connection during more than T 1 (s).
• Hybrid type, i.e., the combination between the above types. The higher the combination order between error types is, the lower the occurrence probability of this event is. Then only the combination of order 2 (i.e., combination between 2 error types) is considered in this paper:
1) combination between packet losses and a handover.
2) combination between packet losses and a connection loss. 3) combination between a handover and a connection loss. Because of the complexity, the analytical analysis for the hybrid error types is not presented in this section. It will be approximated for a particular case study in Section IV. The value of n, T 1 will also be investigated in Section IV-C.
A. Occurrence Probability of Error Type A
In this paragraph, the mathematical formulation of the probability that n consecutive valid messages cannot arrive at the receiver during normal connection will be derived. As presented in the above section, a message is considered as failed when the n r + 1 packets of the retransmission mechanism are failed. In fact, during normal connection period (without connection loss or handover procedure), the packet error at the reception is caused by:
• the packet error rate, p ET .
• the packet obsolescence: transmission time is more than the obsolescence deadline, T o .
Then, the probability that the i-th packet transmission is incorrect is given by:
As the errors of packet transmission during normal connection are independent, the probability that a message transmission is failed, p m , is given by:
Let Q i be the probability that error type A occurs for the first time at the i-th message sending. It is easy to see that: Q i = 0 for i < n and the probability that error type A occurs at the n-th message sending, Fig. 2(a) is:
Then, the probability that error type A occurs for the first time at the (n + h)-th message sending is:
Indeed, we find that error type A occurs for the first time at the (n + h)-th message sending (0 < h ≤ n) if the h-th message is valid at the receiver and then, n next consecutive messages are failed, for example, h = 1, Fig. 2(b) .
Next, considering Fig. 2(c) , error type A occurs for the first time at the (2n + 1)-th message sending if:
• the train receives the (n + 1)-th message, then it does not receive n next consecutive messages.
• and error type A does not occur for the first time at the n-th message sending.
Similarly, we have:
In summary, the probability that error type A occurs for the first time at the i-th message sending is given by:
Therefore, we obtain the following property: 
where Q i is defined by the (9).
B. Distribution Function of Error Type B
Error type B can only occur during handover process. Let D B be the first time occurrence of error type B then D B is always greater than T 1 . It is easy to see that:
It remains to calculate F B (t) = P(D B ≤ t) for t ≥ T 1 . As the occurrence times of handover are totally independent of the time when the previous handover process finishes, the probability that error type B occurs for the first time during the k-th handover process at t is:
where D k is the k-th occurrence time of handover process, defined by (4) or (5); D eH k is the execution time of the k-th handover, defined by (6) . As the occurrence times of handover and their relevant execution times are independent, the F B k (t) can be rewritten as:
Finally, we obtain the following property. Property 2: The probability that at t, t > T 1 , the handover execution time is more than a certain time, T 1 (s), which is the distribution function of error type B, is given by:
where (4) or (5).
C. Distribution Function of Error Type C
Recall that: where
) and is the time to reconnection and that T d is the time to detect the timeout.
Let D C be the first time occurrence of error type C. Similarly to case B, we have: P(D C ≤ t) = 0, ∀t < T 1 and it remains to calculate:
If D oc k is the first out-time duration which is longer than T 1 then:
The probability that error type C occurs at t is given by:
where
and (D oc k ) k≥1 are independent, it implies that in (13), we can replace the sum
Hence we obtain:
Property 3: The distribution function of error type C when the time of connection is more than a certain time T 1 is written by
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND SIMULATION APPROACH: VALIDATION ON A CASE STUDY
In the previous section, we derive three properties for evaluating the occurrence probabilities of the principal communication error types. In this section, using these properties, we calculate the occurrence probability of the CE, e.g., "sending an emergency braking message from TCC to train 2" due to communication errors between the TCC and train 1. This is a probability related to the T b value mentioned in Section I. We will firstly describe the case study in Section IV-A. Next, the simulation approach (PN here) will be is briefly in Section IV-B. Finally, the analytical process will be performed (by Matlab) in order to evaluate the CE probability occurrence in Section IV-C. We also compare the results obtained by every step of the analytical process to the ones obtained by the PN simulation to verify their accuracy.
Note that the mathematical formulas in Section IV-C could be evaluated by any numerical computing environment, such as Matlab, R, C++, etc. In this paper, we use Matlab. On the other hand, according to standard IEC 61508-part 6 (page 76), the PN based on Monte Carlo simulation is an efficient method for modeling dynamic system. Therefore, we believe that a comparison with a PN simulation tool (of GRIF platform) is enough to highlight the performance of the proposed approach, which is totally independent of the PN simulation. In fact, our analytical approach is not time-consuming. It allows us to avoid the simulation execution time and to obtain results as good as the one of the classic PN simulation. The difference between analytical result (AR) and simulation result (SR) is quantitatively evaluated by the relative error, r :
A. Description of the Case Study
Considering the train's journey time, T m = 3600 s (average journey duration of urban train, [23] ). Several values of T s , the interval time between two consecutive position message sending of the train, are chosen in the context of CBTC systems (in the SYSTUF project 3 ), T s ∈ [0.2, 0.6] s. Note that these values are very low compared to the value of 5 s mentioned in ETCS requirements. This is due to the continuous monitoring requirements for the Mass Transit system-CBTC, aiming to enforce train speed profiles, headway and dwell times, [4] . As LTE technology is considered as the final answer-piece in the puzzle to the convergence prospect between ETCS and CBTC systems, our case study is dedicated to a simple example of LTE-based TCS, and furthermore the parameter values in both reference sections of ETCS and CBTC can be inherited, given in Table I .
Note that the input parameters are chosen (1) based on [18] , (2) based on [9] (mean transfer delay for a message of 500 bytes is about 5 ms), (3) based on [27] , (4) based on [28] with the assumption that the target cell is already known, (5) arbitrarily but try to come close to reality. 4 In fact, Fig. 3 presents the considered distribution of the eNodeB along the urban railway line. As the distance between two eNodeB is fixed and also the relevant velocity parameters of the train are specified in advance, then the occurrence time of the handover could be considered as constant, T Ho s for a given radio planning. 
B. Modeling and Simulation Approach Applied to the Case Study
Petri net (PN) is a graphical and mathematical formalism for modeling discrete event systems with time-dependent behaviors and is widely employed to model complex systems, [29] . Simulation of PN models is a common technique to perform dependability assessments.
In this paper, we propose to use the PN module of the software platform GRIF 5 for evaluating the occurrence probability of the CE. In detail, SPN with predicates and assertions are used to model the CBTC system based on the LTE technology. Note that in the CBTC system, the TCS is normally called zone controller (ZC). For quantitative evaluation, a high-speed Monte Carlo simulation engine (MOCA-RP) is used.
The CBTC system is modeled with 4 sub-nets describing:
1) handover procedure 2) re-connection procedure 3) transmission and re-transmission procedure 4) Zone controller (ZC) operation.
The sub-nets modeling procedures 1, 2, and 3 are similar to those presented in [20] . Fig. 4 presents the sub-net for modeling the ZC operation: "sending emergency braking message". In detail, after receiving a valid packet from the train, "Tr12" is triggered and the ZC sends an ACK to the train, i.e., the token in "packet_OK" place (num. 6) is removed and another is created in "ZC_ACK" place (num. 12). The ACK processing of the train is modeled in the "transmission and re-transmission" sub-net described in [20] . Another token simultaneously comes to the "ZC_preaction" place (num. 7). Within the deadline T o of the train message, if the ZC receives another copy of this train message, these copies are rejected, i.e., the "rejectdouble" transition is then triggered. When a token is created in place 58, the timer (place 11 that validates the "Tr20" transition for the T b time counting) is reset. If not, after T b s, the ZC sends an emergency braking message to train 2 and the variable "CE" is set to true. 
C. Formulation of the Analytical Approach and Discussion of the Accuracy of Its Results
1) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than T b s Due to the Communication Error Type A:
In the Section III-1, the occurrence probability of error type A (n consecutive valid messages cannot arrive at the receiver during normal connection) was evaluated. Now, in this section we will present the way to evaluate the occurrence probability of the CE caused by error type A (CE A ). This way depends on the relationship between T b (maximum accepted duration without valid position message) and T s (time between two position/integrity messages generated by the train). In detail, the occurrence probability of CE A will be evaluated in the following two cases (where n is an integer such as
As T o is very small, it is not necessary to consider the case nT s < T b < nT s + T o . This case can be considered as the case T b = nT s .
In the first case when T b > nT s + T o (cf. case 1) in Fig. 5 where n = 3), the CE occurs when n consecutive messages are invalid. In this case the pdf of the CE A is given by (9) .
In the second case when T b = nT s , the CE A will occur if: 1) n consecutive messages are invalid (similar to the first case), or 2) only (n − 1) consecutive messages are invalid with the condition that the transmission delay of the n-th message, D p , is superior to the transmission delay D p of the message 0. The message 0 is the last valid message that arrives at the ZC before the missing consecutive messages, (cf. case 2) in Fig. 5 where n = 3). The probability that D p > D p is calculated by: Then, the probability that CE A occurs for the first time at the n-th message sending is given by: (9), the pdf of the CE A (missing consecutive valid messages for more than T b s) can be rewritten as follows: Fig. 6 compares the results between the analytical approach and the simulation approach of the occurrence probability of the CE A (presented by the vertical axis) during a train journey when p ET = 0.1, T b = T s + 0.1 (an example for the case T b > nT s + T o ) or T b = 2T s (an example for the case T b = nT s ). We find that the results for both approaches are almost the same. In fact, the r , that is presented by percentage number according to every value point of P CE A , is smaller than 1.3% for all cases.
Then, the analytical approach is used to consider how T b is chosen in order to limit the impact of error type A on the CE during a train journey. It means that T b is investigated such as P CE A (1 h) ≤ 1E − 5. Table II presents the occurrence probability of the CE A according to every value of T s , p ET , T b . All probability values are indicated in the second line of each row corresponding to a value of p ET . Hereunder are two examples taken from Table II: 1) for T s = 0.2 and p ET = 0.1, the occurrence probability of CE A can be negligible when T b ≥ 0.7. 2) for T s = 0.2 and p ET = 0.4, the occurrence probability of CE A can be negligible when T b ≥ 1.3.
2) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than T b s Due to the Communication Error Type B:
Let message 0 be the last valid message that arrives at the ZC before the handover occurrence. Similarly to the previous subsection, the occurrence probability of the CE caused by error type B, CE B will be evaluated in two cases.
For the first case when T b > nT s + T o (cf. the example in Fig. 7 with n = 3), the CE B occurs at the k-th handover when the execution time of the handover is more than T 1 s. T 1 is given by:
Then, from (11), the probability of the CE B occurs for the first time at the k-th handover when T b > nT s + T o is given by:
where D k = kT Ho when the time interval T Ho between two handover occurrences is assumed to be constant. For the second case when T b = nT s , the CE B occurs for the first time at the k-th handover when: 1) the execution time of the handover is more than T 1 , given by (17). 2) or the execution time of the handover is more than
) and the transmission delay of the n-th message, D p is superior to the transmission delay D p of the message 0. (Fig. 8 when  n = 3) .
Then, when T b = nT s , the probability that CE B occurs for the first time at the k-th handover is given by: Fig. 9 compares the results between the analytical approach and the simulation approach of the occurrence probability of the CE B (presented by the vertical axis) during a train journey when T b = 2T s + 0.1 (an example for the case T b > nT s + T o ) and T b = 3T s (an example for the case T b = nT s ). We find that the results of two approaches are almost the same. In fact, the r , that is presented by percentage number according to every value point of P CE B , is not important. In the worst case, when P CE B < 0.005, then r < 5% of P CE B obtained by the simulation approach.
Then, the analytical approach is applied to evaluate the occurrence probability of rare events in order to consider for which value of T b , the impact of error Type B during a train journey can be negligible (P CE B (1 h) ≤ 1E − 5). Hereunder are two examples taken from Table III that has the same presentation principles of −4 /h [18] , the probability that the connection loss occurs more than 2 times during a train journey is negligible. Therefore, F C (t) can be re-written as:
Similarly to the communication error Type B, the occurrence probability of the CE C is calculated in the following two cases:
For the first case when T b > nT s + T o , CE C occurs if the connection time-out D oc is more than T 1 , that is given by (17) 
where D l is the occurrence time of the l-th connection loss. (20), the occurrence probability of the CE C in this case is:
+ . For the second case when T b = nT s , similarly to error type B, the probability that CE C occurs during [0, t] is given by:
where Fig. 10 compares the results between the analytical approach and the simulation approach of the occurrence probability of the CE C during a train journey, according to T b ∈ [1, 6] s. We find that the simulation results are between the inferior threshold (P EC C inf ) and superior threshold (P EC Csup ) of the analytical approach. Then, hereafter the probability that CE occurs due to error type C can be approximated by:
The maximal value of P EC C (t) during a journey is about 10 −4 . Hence, the occurrence probability of any hybrid communication error where one error among the two is a connection loss, is always inferior to 10 −4 . Therefore, the hybrid error where one error among the two is a connection loss can be negligible in further works. 
4) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than T b s Due to the Hybrid Error "Error Type A and Error Type B":
In this section, we examine the cases, in which error Type A occurs before or after the handover process, and this combination leads to missing consecutive valid messages for more than T b (s). It is called error Type H.
Note that for this hybrid error type, we consider that the duration of handover cannot directly lead to CE as this case was presented before. So, error type A is combined with handover processes in order to have CE H .
Similarly to other error types, the occurrence probability of error Type H is evaluated in two different cases linking T b and T s .
For the first case when T b > nT s + T o ,
• The occurrence probability of CE H , caused by the event that one message is invalid due to error type A before (or after) the k-th handover, is given by:
where p m is given by the (8) and T 1 is given by the (17).
• Similarly, the occurrence probability of CE H , caused by the event that i messages are invalid due to error type A before (or after) the k-th handover, is given by:
• Hence, the occurrence probability of CE H is given by:
We find that
When (P CE H_1 (·))/(P CE H_i (·)) 1, the P CE H can be approximated by the P CE H_1 .
For the second case when T b = nT s ,
where p m is given by (8) , T 1 is given by (17) , and
• Similar to the first case, the occurrence probability of CE H could be approximatively by CE H_1 .
5) Analytical Process for Evaluating the Occurrence Probability of CE During the Mission Time:
Output: Probability that CE occurs during the mission time (T m ) of the train, P CE (T m )
Initialisation: i = 1 1: Evaluate the probability P CE 1 , that CE occurs for the first time before the first handover.
Evaluate
LOOP Process
Evaluate the probabilityP CE that CE does not occur yet until the i-th handover. 8: Evaluate the probability P CE i , that CE occurs for the first time during ](i − 1)T Ho , iT Ho ].
9: end for 10: Evaluate the probability that CE occurs during the mission time T m Fig. 11 presents the simulation results and the analytical results for the occurrence probability of the CE during a train journey according to T b . We find that for the case study, the analytical approach gives close results compared to the results of the simulation approach [see Fig. 11(a) ]. However, for the small value of P CE (P CE ∼ = 1E − 4), the relative error is quite significant 0.2 < r < 0.25 [see Fig. 11(b) ] because of the simulation approach's defect when evaluating the small probabilities. In fact, considering only 10 6 scenarios, the simulation approach cannot give the results within 12 h, for example when T s = 0.3 s and T b > 1.2 s. Therefore, for small probabilities, the analytical approach is more powerful. And based on the analytical approach result, we find that when T b is large enough compared to T s , the impact of error type A, B, and H can be negligible. For example when T s = 0.6 s and T b = 2 s, the occurrence probability of the CE strictly depends on error type C: "connection loss", P CE (= 9.25E − 5) P CE C (= 9.27E − 5). Moreover, considering Fig. 10 , the decreasing of P CE C is not important according to T b . Therefore, when T b = 2 s, it is not necessary to increase T b in order to reduce the occurrence probability of CE.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new analytical analysis to evaluate the consequences on safety level of the wireless communication errors in train control application. In detail, three principal error types, which lead to consecutive invalid messages, such as packet error rate, long handover execution time, and connection loss, were analyzed. The new analytical approach was developed to evaluate the occurrence probability of CE: "missing invalid consecutive messages sent from the train to the zone controller for more than T b s"; where T b is the waiting time before sending an emergency braking message from the TCC to the train behind. When comparing the new approach with the simulation approach based on a Petri net model, we obtained the same results. Furthermore, the efficiency and the robustness of our analytical approach were highlighted in the cases of small probabilities of CE when the accuracy of the simulation approach and its execution time cannot meet user requirements due to its approximate statistic calculations. Considering the case study of the LTE-based CBTC system, our approach was applied to identify the appropriate threshold of the waiting time, T b , in order to limit the occurrence probabilities of the CE according to every error type.
The analytical results presented in this paper constitute the prerequisite to analyze the RAMS parameters of the WCS in train control application. In order to ensure the desired level of performance for the safety application (CBTC here), according to the V-model of the product life-cycle presented in the EN 50126 standard, a new system (LTE-based communication system in this case) is not only evaluated and tested in the last phases after the complete development but also in the early design phases. Indeed, following the studies of [10] , [11] corresponding to every proposed configuration (or architecture) of the LTE-based communication system, the performance parameters of the communication system (such as packet delay, packet error rate, communication loss rate, etc) can be obtained by OPNET simulation. Then, using these parameters as inputs, the analytical approach proposed in this paper can examine whether the studied system is able to guarantee a given level of performance (an acceptable value of the probability of the critical events) or not. Moreover, our analytical approach could be applied in order to identify the appropriate values for communication performance parameters. Therefore, it aims to make recommendations for implementing the appropriate architecture/configuration of the LTE based CBTC system.
On the other hand, as the assumption about exponential distribution of delay packet and of handover execution time is considered as limitation of our model. It should be better to study which distribution is more appropriate to empirical data. Note that the modification of these assumptions does not significantly affect the proposed approach. Indeed, when considering another distribution for packet delay, such as gamma or logistic distribution [7] , we only re-evaluate the probability that the transmission time is more than the obsolescence deadline [in Eq. (7) of the Section III-A]. Finally, a further work could consider distance management between trains to perform the sensitivity analysis of the dependability and the safety parameters of the TCS based on WCS.
